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Why Yellow Fever Isn’t Flattering: A Case
Against Racial Fetishes
abstract: Most discussions of racial fetish center on the question of whether it
is caused by negative racial stereotypes. In this paper I adopt a different strategy,
one that begins with the experiences of those targeted by racial fetish rather than
those who possess it; that is, I shift focus away from the origins of racial fetishes
to their effects as a social phenomenon in a racially stratified world. I examine
the case of preferences for Asian women, also known as ‘yellow fever’, to argue
against the claim that racial fetishes are unobjectionable if they are merely based
on personal or aesthetic preference rather than racial stereotypes. I contend that
even if this were so, yellow fever would still be morally objectionable because
of the disproportionate psychological burdens it places on Asian and Asian-
American women, along with the role it plays in a pernicious system of racial
social meanings.
keywords: ethics, feminist ethics, feminism, social philosophy, philosophy of race,
critical race theory
Race makes a demonstrable difference everywhere: in the workplace and in
neighborhoods, in print and on screen, in schools, hospitals, and prisons. We
should not be surprised to see the effects of race on even the most intimate spheres
of our lives: dating, sex, romance, and marriage. Philosophers have decried the
hypocrisy and harms of ‘sexual racism’ (Coleman 2011; Thomas 1999), that is, the
exclusion of others from sexual intimacy on the basis of race, while simultaneously
issuing cautions against the naı¨ve view that interracial relationships are guarantors
of racial progress (Mills 1994; Allen 2000; Sundstrom 2008; for empirical work on
sexual racism, see Callander, Holt, andNewman 2012; Caluya 2008; Raj 2011; and
Riggs 2013.) These discussions have focused primarily on the moral dimensions of
sexually preferring one’s own race and whether that analysis differs for dominant
and marginalized racial groups. But there has been scarcely any mention of what
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might be the most visibly racialized sexual phenomenon of all: racial fetish, that is,
a person’s exclusive or near-exclusive preference for sexual intimacy with others
belonging to a specific racial out-group. A paradigm example of racial fetish is what
is popularly known as ‘yellow fever’: a preference for Asian women (and men).
I shall be particularly concerned with the case of yellow fever because it is well-
known and because it best exemplifies the points I wish to make. (For a sense of
how yellow fever has long been an object of popular fascination, consider the fact
that UrbanDictionary.com, the premier source for user-generated documentation
of contemporary slang, boasts no less than 27 definitions of yellow fever, the hit
blog ‘Stuff White People Like’ lists ‘Asian women’ as #11 on a list containing
over a hundred items, and discussions of yellow fever have regularly appeared in
magazine, television, radio, and newspaper articles over the past three decades.)
In contrast to sexual racism, the motivations involved in racial fetish are often
assumed to be positive or at least harmless. As one woman puts it: ‘Asian fetishism
has a long history of being brushed off as a compliment, rather than offensive or
bigoted. I’ve been told I ought to be flattered that so many non-Asian men “prefer”
Asians and Asian American women’ (Chang 2006: 5; see also sMash 2012).
This, then, is my target: the idea that racial fetishism is morally unobjectionable
if it is merely an ‘aesthetic’ or ‘personal’ preference. In section 1, I reconstruct
and contextualize an argument for this claim, which I call the Mere Preferences
Argument (MPA). In section 2, I raise a concern regarding the most common
strategy—to which I am nevertheless highly sympathetic—of rejecting the MPA,
which is to argue that such preferences derive from negative racial stereotypes on
the part of individuals who have them. In section 3 I adopt a different strategy
and begin with the experiences of those targeted by racial fetish rather than
those who possess it. I foreground the testimony of Asian and Asian-American
(henceforth ‘Asian/American’) women, whose voices not only remain on the
margins of contemporary academic philosophy, but whose unique racial vantage
point complicates a racial discourse overwhelmingly centered on the Black/White
binary and the oppression of black and brown bodies. I argue that yellow fever
is objectionable because of the disproportionate psychological burdens it places
on Asian/American women, which derive from the part yellow fever plays in
a pernicious system of racial meanings. Finally, in section 4, I consider some
objections and conclude by recommending a more forward-looking and structural
approach. The key, I argue, is shifting our focus away from the psychological origins
of racial fetish in particular individuals to its effects as a social phenomenon in a
racially stratified world; in doing so we fortify our critical toolbox with arguments
designed for a purportedly ‘postracial’ world.
1. The Mere Preferences Argument and Racial Ideology
Let me begin with a few clarifications and caveats. First of all, I use the term ‘racial
fetish’ advisedly.While I regret and do not intend to invoke themedicalizedmeaning
of ‘fetish’ as a psychological disorder, this is by far the most common (and pithy)
term; moreover, as will become clear, I think this popular use reflects important
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aspects of the social or expressive meaning of such preferences. Second, I group
together sex, dating, love, romance, etc. under the metonym of the ‘sexual’ and
for the most part do not discuss their undeniable differences. As sexual attraction
is generally assumed to be a necessary condition of love relationships and sexual
encounters are understood often to engender love relationships, I think this is not
unwarranted. Moreover, encounters with racial fetish typically occur in the context
of dating, where it is typically unclear and constantly negotiable whether sex, love,
or both are involved. Third, my discussion of yellow fever applies primarily to
Asian/American women in the United States though it might generalize to other
formerly colonialist countries with Asian immigrant populations. While yellow
fever certainly exists (and, indeed, is a powerful economic driver) in Asian countries,
the history of colonization and continued postcolonial exploitation raises issues
beyond the scope of this paper.1
A common defense of racial fetishes is the claim that they are ‘just a preference’.
What is usually meant, which I will call the Mere Preferences Argument (MPA), is
something like the following:
1. There is nothing morally objectionable about sexual preferences for
hair color, eye color, and other nonracialized phenotypic traits.
2. Preferences for racialized physical traits are no different from
preferences for nonracialized phenotypic traits.
Therefore,
3. ‘Mere’ preferences for racialized phenotypic traits are not morally
objectionable.
To be sure, people may have other reasons for their racialized preferences. But
in an age when racial generalizations and stereotypes are widely recognized to be
problematic, contemporary defenders of yellow fever (and sexual racism) typically
seek to deny that their preferences are anything but purely superficial physical
attraction; hence the MPA is my present quarry (Kim 2011: 241; Prasso 2006:
149; Cohen 2002: 166). Bitna Kim’s (2011: 241) study of men who prefer Asian
women, for example, quotes one: ‘Why is it okay, for example, for a man to like
and be attracted to blonde girls? Why don’t they have a blonde fetish that is looked
down upon? So what if a White guy happens to think that Asian women are the
most beautiful in the world? Why is that so wrong?’ Such beliefs are not limited
to nonphilosophers. Raja Halwani (forthcoming), in the most comprehensive and
direct treatment of racial fetish to date in the philosophical literature, claims the
following (it is important to note, however, that Halwani’s discussion is intended
to apply only to sexual and not love, marriage, or other intimate relationships):
Just as in the case of [a person who is not sexually attracted to skinny
people] we have no good reason to claim that he unfairly discriminates
against skinny people, we also have no good reason to claim in the case
1 I am grateful to Petra van Brabandt for discussion of this point.
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of [a person with yellow fever] that he unfairly discriminates against
non-Asians.... If P is necessary for the proper satisfaction of sexual
desire, then in choosing Y’s who are P, X is not unfairly discriminating
against people who are not P. It just so happens that in this case P is a
racial or ethnic property.
Similarly, Charles Mills (1994: 145) claims that ‘sexual exoticism per se’, which
can plausibly be interpreted to mean preferences based on mere phenotype and not
stereotype, is ethically unobjectionable so long as there is no deceit involved.
TheMPA assumes what Elizabeth Anderson (2010: 157) refers to as the concept
of ‘minimal race’. Minimal race is a classification scheme whereby human beings
are divided into groups according to what Paul Taylor (2013) elegantly calls ‘bodies
and bloodlines’—clusters of phenotypic traits along with geographical ancestry—
but without ascriptions of any particular physical, mental, or moral traits to
these different groups. By relying on minimal race, advocates of the MPA equate
racial fetishes to other preferences for nonracialized phenotypic traits that are
widely recognized and found to be morally acceptable. This is evident in the way
yellow fever is so frequently justified, as by Kim’s (2011) interview subject, as an
appreciation of Asian women’s physical beauty, i.e., of superficial physical traits
and nothing deeper.
I believe theMPA has special currency in a purportedly ‘postracial’ society where
many claim that race no longer matters. Most people do not (openly) endorse
classically racist beliefs that different races exhibit different physical, mental, or
moral traits. But appeal to minimal race bolsters what sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-
Silva (2013) calls a ‘color-blind’ racial ideology that explains manifestly racialized
patterns of outcomes and behavior in terms of nonracial processes, thereby denying
the continued existence of racial bias, discrimination, and prejudice. ‘Birds of a
feather flock together’, someone might say, or ‘people naturally self-segregate’ to
account for persistent and obvious racial segregation in housing, friendship, and
marriage (Bonilla-Silva 2013: 76). The MPA supports, and is likely to be motivated
by, belief in color-blind ideology.
In light of this, let me point out that the MPA has distinct significance for
the case of Asian/American women because of their specific racial location.
Sociologists have documented the ways in which Asian/Americans are viewed
(however inaccurately) as ‘model minorities’ or ‘honorary whites’, with high levels
of education, economic achievement, and cultural assimilation (e.g., Chou and
Feagin 2014). Less marked by overtly negative stereotypes, Asian/Americans are
often invisible from mainstream narratives of racial discrimination and prejudice
faced by more conspicuously disadvantaged groups such as Blacks and Latino/as.
Asian/Americans thus represent an especially important test case for the MPA as
they are the closest approximation to a group that might be claimed to experience
only the effects of minimal race.
One upshot of this proximity to Whiteness is that some Asian/Americans
themselves adopt ‘a color-blind discourse that prevents them from articulating
the racialized nature of certain social experiences... and leaves them unprepared to
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2016.25
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 137.132.220.97, on 09 Jan 2017 at 07:59:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
404 robin zheng
deal with and process racism’ (Chou, Lee, and Ho 2015: 307). It is unsurprising
then that even Asian/American women who profess discomfort with yellow fever
may be unable to respond when confronted with the MPA. Kumiko Nemoto’s
(2006: 34) study of Asian/American women in interracial relationships describes
the case of Irene, whose initial response to her boyfriend had been to think: ‘Oh
no, he likes Asian girls. I didn’t like dating guys like that. No, not at all. Growing
up Asian, you inevitably meet guys like, “Oh, I love Asian culture”.... I hate that’.
Yet, as Nemoto reports:
Irene still was trying to make sense of the fact that Brian had dated only
Asian girls and was primarily attracted to Asians. Irene speculated that
he liked the physical appearance of Asian/American women and not
necessarily Asian cultures or languages: ‘That’s what his idea of beauty
is. So, that’s acceptable. I mean it is. He finds a certain type of person
attractive.... There’s nothing you can do about it logically’. (2006: 34)
Rosalind Chou (2012: 93) quotes another subject who laments, ‘It’s absolutely
ridiculous and I realize that now, but at the time I was just still so young
and I hadn’t learned about everything yet. I knew it didn’t sit right, but I
didn’t know why’. Arguably, these women experience what Miranda Fricker
(2007) calls a ‘hermeneutical injustice’, that is, an inability to make sense of
their own experiences due to marginalization from the collective framework of
understanding—in particular, I claim, due to a color-blind ideology that centers
White experience and ignores racial dynamics salient from other points of view.
In the rest of this paper I shall endeavor to rectify this hermeneutical injustice by
validating Asian women’s aversion to yellow fever and refuting the idea that there
is nothing further to be done (or said) in the face of the MPA.
2. Yellow Fever and Racial Stereotypes
One response to the MPA, which I set aside here but take to have considerable
merit, is rejecting the first premise. Much empirical research demonstrates that
preferences for conventionally attractive phenotypic traits systematically and
unjustly disadvantage the life prospects of those who lack them; philosophers have
argued that such preferences represent a form of unfair discrimination (Willard
1977; Soble 1982; Rhode 2010). Moreover, feminists have argued that treating
physical attractiveness as a prerequisite for sex and love is oppressive to women,
who are already disproportionately judged and valued for how well they conform
to feminine beauty ideals rather than for their intellect, ability, and other qualities
(Wolf 1991; Bartky 1990). These considerations suggest that sexual preferences for
(conventionally attractive) phenotypic traits can indeed be objectionable on moral
and political grounds.
However, the most obvious response to theMPA is rejecting the second premise.
This is indeed the standard move in popular discourse (e.g., Cohen 2002: 166).
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Many Asian/American women detail the racial stereotypes they feel subjected to by
men with yellow fever, along with the significant emotional labor required to fulfill,
resist, or otherwise negotiate those stereotypes (Chou 2012; Chou, Lee, and Ho
2012, 2015; Nemoto 2009; Sue et al. 2007). Even worse, stereotypes about Asian
women render them particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment and violence by
men who target them on that basis (Cho 1997; Lee 1996; Patel 2009; Park 2012;
Woan 2007). There is thus ample reason to be morally concerned about sexualized
racial stereotypes of Asian women.
The response to theMPA here is twofold: first, individuals’ racial fetishes always
depend on racial stereotypes rather than pure aesthetic features, and second, explicit
disavowals of the stereotypes provide no evidence against this fact because the
origins of sexual preferences are not usually transparent to those who have them.
This amounts to a rejection of the MPA’s assumption that preferences can be based
on minimal race, asserting instead that they necessarily involve thicker ascriptions
of traits to racial groups.
These claims find a great deal of support in scholarly empirical research.
Historians, sociologists, psychologists, and literary and film scholars have long
documented how White America has viewed Asian/American women in an
almost entirely sexual light. This literature demonstrates the mutually reinforcing
relationship between material practices, such as federal immigration law, military
occupation of East and southeast Asia, war brides, sex tourism, pornography, and
mail-order brides, on the one hand, and cultural portrayals of Asian women as the
docile, domestic ‘Lotus Blossom’ or the seductive, treacherous ‘Dragon Lady’ on
the other (e.g., Chan 1988; Mazumdar 1989; Tajima 1989; Uchida 1998; Parren˜as
Shimizu 2007; Woan 2007). In more recent decades, Sumi Cho (1997) and Susan
Koshy (2004) argue, the emergence of the Asian ‘model minority’ stereotype—
according to which the economic success of (some) Asian immigrant communities
has been attributed to a strong work ethic and a culture of valuing education—
has combined with prevailing sexual stereotypes to generate a representation of
Asian women as the ‘sexual model minority’: ideal in their union of sex appeal
with family-centered values and a strong work ethic. (It is worth mentioning,
as Cho [1997] points out, that this sexual model minority stereotype pits Asian
women as a foil against stereotypes of lazy and politically demanding Blacks and
against (White) women endorsing feminist values of independence and autonomy.)
Some evidence suggests that yellow fever may be motivated by an antifeminist
backlash in men who wish to return to traditional gender roles supposedly
exemplified by the demure, obedient Asian woman (Cho 1997; Fujino 2000;
Prasso 2006). As Kim (2011: 237) reports from her study: ‘Almost all of those
interviewees started with a sentence that negates Asian women as submissive, but,
nevertheless, they all mentioned, in one way or another, that Asian women are
submissive’.
Moreover, the ‘gendering’ of races, whereby Asians as a racialized group are
stereotyped as feminine, due to their purportedly shy, soft-spoken, submissive racial
‘essence’, produces what might be called the ‘double feminization’ of the Asian
woman (Arisaka 2000; Galinsky, Hall, and Cuddy 2013; Johnson, Freeman and
Pauker 2012; strikingly, the exact inverse effects are found for Blacks as a racialized
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group, who again, due to their purportedly aggressive ‘essence’, are stereotyped as
masculine). It is this double feminization that increases the sexual capital of Asian
women but not that of Asian men, a fact perfectly borne out in the oft-noted greater
number of relationships between Asian women and White men compared to the
number of Asian men in relationships with White women (e.g., Feliciano, Robnett,
and Komaie 2009), in attractiveness ratings that rank Asians highest among women
but lowest among men (Lewis 2012), and in the greater representation of Asian
women compared to Asian men in popular media (Schug et al. 2015). This cross-
disciplinary body of work supports the claim that it would be utterly unrealistic
to deny that lengthy exposure to a culture historically saturated with sexualized
stereotypes of Asian women contributes to an individual’s sexually preferring them,
even if that contribution is not obvious or accessible to introspection.
Philosophers typically share this concern about racial stereotypes behind racial
fetish. Mills (1994), though accepting of mere sexual exoticism, develops an
argument for morally criticizing sexual preferences that involve ‘acceptance of a
white racist stereotype of beauty’ at the expense of non-White racialized phenotypic
traits. Presumably, such criticism also applies to sexualized stereotypes of Asian
beauty. And although Halwani’s (forthcoming) main objective is to argue against
attempts to conclude from a person’s racial fetish that she is racist or ethically
defective, his criteria for assessing racism are primarily concerned with the role
of racial stereotypes: we are to check whether the preference contains stereotypes,
whether those stereotypes are operative in nonsexual contexts, and whether the
person endorses or rejects those stereotypes.
I am wary, however, of leaning too heavily on arguments against racial fetish
that appeal to its origins in individuals’ (implicit) stereotyping because the nebulous
nature of sexual preference cuts both ways. As Halwani (forthcoming) points out,
it certainly seems possible (even if unlikely) that some individuals’ racial fetishes
do not depend in any way on stereotypes; we should not rule out of hand the
possibility of individual variation here. Racial fetishes might be based on mere
accidents of geography and local demography or even more idiosyncratic personal
histories—a first girlfriend or sexual encounter, say. But I don’t think that any
of this stops racial fetishes from being objectionable or that the targets of yellow
fever should not feel bothered when fetishists have their preference for these other
reasons. What I am advocating is that we leave aside a preoccupation with the
precise origins and nature of yellow fever in particular individuals—which may be
impossible to identify with certainty—in order to understand its social effects in a
racially segregated and hierarchically ordered world.
3. The Impact and Social Meaning of Yellow Fever
Halwani’s (forthcoming) conclusion is that some people with racial fetishes are
racists while ‘others are like people with other sexual preferences—warranting at
most a “Who cares?” attitude’. I think, however, that this is too hasty. From
the fact that people with racial fetishes are not racists it does not follow that
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there is nothing morally problematic or criticizable about their preferences. For
there is another group of affected parties that Halwani fails to consider here: not
the people who have racial fetishes, but those targeted by them. It is morally
problematic, indeed unjust, when some people suffer disproportionate harms or
burdens on the basis of their race and when they are wrongly represented in
their sexual capacities. This is one way of understanding some of the wrongs of
sexism: women suffer disproportionate sexual harms—objectification, harassment,
domestic violence, rape—on account of their gender and are wrongly represented
as only valuable in virtue of their sexual capacities, as desiring to be raped, etc.
I shall now argue, using the example of yellow fever, that both of these are
consequences of racial fetish even when it involves only a concept of minimal race.
This gives us alternative (or additional) reasons to reject the second premise of
the MPA.
I take Asian/American women’s testimony as my starting point for two reasons:
first, the additional psychological burden generated by having to cope with yellow
fever constitute a form of racial disadvantage in and of itself, and second, the
nature of these burdens is an indicator of the negative social meanings expressed
by the existence of yellow fever. An overwhelmingly common response from
Asian/American women in both popular media and social scientific literature is
one of being forced to negotiate constant doubt and suspicion (see e.g., Chang
2006; Chu 2009; and Chou 2012; Chou, Lee, and Ho 2012, 2015; Nemoto 2009).
Asian/American women consistently report being wary of men with histories of
yellow fever, even warning each other against dating venues where they are likely
to be targeted for their race (Chou 2012: 94; Chou, Lee, and Ho 2012: 11–12;
2015: 309). They describe constant uncertainty over whether others are interested
in them for their race. ‘Every time someone messages me, I wonder if it’s because
I’m Asian’, a woman states inMarie Clairemagazine (Chu 2009). ‘I still constantly
question if any of the other people I’ve been involved with or who have found
me attractive only felt that way because I’m an Asian woman’, a blogger writes
(sMash 2012).
One aspect of this doubt is that targets of yellow fever feel depersonalized or
homogenized. ‘It always crosses my mind’, one reports to the OC Weekly, ‘that
I’m replaceable’ (Chang 2006). While Asian/American women are already subject
to sexual objectification as women, racial depersonalization involves a further
dimension of objectification that Martha Nussbaum (1995: 257) calls ‘fungibility’
and in which a person is treated like an object interchangeable with other objects.
Importantly, depersonalization can occur merely on the basis of minimal race. For
example, the ‘own-race bias’ and ‘out-group homogeneity effect’ in which people
find it more difficult (visually) to distinguish members of racial out-groups than
in-groups is an instance of racial depersonalization that involves no stereotypical
content (Park and Rothbart 1982, Meissner and Brigham 2001). Siy and Cheryan
(2013) show that racial depersonalization is a particularly negative experience in
contexts where it matters to be recognized as an individual. As many philosophers
have argued, however, love relationships are precisely such a context: love requires
just the opposite of fungibility, such that the beloved could not simply be replaced by
someone else with similar qualities (e.g., Kraut 1987; Kolodny 2003). As Frankfurt
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2016.25
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 137.132.220.97, on 09 Jan 2017 at 07:59:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
408 robin zheng
(2004: 5) writes, love is ‘ineluctably particular’, or as we might say, it requires
being loved for yourself, for who you are. The racial depersonalization inherent
in yellow fever threatens Asian/American women with doubts as to whether they
are or can be loved as individuals rather than as objects in a category. As Irene,
from Nemoto’s (2009: 95) study, confesses at one point: ‘Sometimes I ask myself
if it is because I’m Asian that he’s attracted to me because I know that initially, of
course, that’s what it was. But sometimes, I kind of ask myself, like, if that is the
only reason why. I know it is not. But in the back of your head... ’. Doubts about
yellow fever are painful, and hard to shake.
Another problem is that targets of yellow fever feel otherized. They are separated
and held to a different standard. As one of Chou, Lee, andHo’s (2015: 308) subjects
puts it: ‘I guess I am shallowly complimented, and then I get annoyed because there
shouldn’t be this discrepancy between “sexy” and “sexy Asian”’. They write: ‘The
“compliment” to her said something more specific about her race. For example,
she is sexy because she is Asian or in spite of it’ (Chou, Lee, and Ho 2015: 308).
This otherization is especially acute because Asian/American women—like other
women of color—often already suffer from feeling locked out of mainstreamWhite
standards of beauty (Mok 1998; Chou 2012). And it is an upshot of the mere racial
difference involved in minimal race, based on phenotype rather than stereotypes.
Asian/American women face a double bind here: their racial difference is either
a failure to conform to White standards or only appreciable by alternative or
abnormal standards (cf. Raj 2011 on the case of Asian/American men). Connie
Chan (1988: 37) describes women who feel ‘uncomfortable with the attention
given to them as a result of their race or gender’, quoting one who says: ‘I never felt
that I was being complimented for being myself, or the way I looked, but rather
for being an Asian female who looked exotic. I stopped trusting any compliments,
even ones which were not about my physical appearance’. Another blogs, ‘I still
feel like I have been objectified, exotified, and hypersexualized because of my race
and sometimes I have trouble trusting people who find me attractive because of
that’ (sMash 2012). Such doubts are detrimental to a person’s (sexual) self-respect
and self-esteem.
My contention is that the doubts and suspicions experienced by individual
targets of yellow fever constitute unfair harms in themselves that reflect ongoing
racial disadvantage, whether or not Asian/American women are actually being
homogenized or otherized by men with yellow fever. The limited evidence available
from firsthand accounts by men interviewed by Walsh (1990), Weaver (1998),
Kim’s (2011) study, Prasso (2006: 141), and by participants in online yellow-fever
communities and mail-order bride services (Prasso 2006: 147–57, 157–63), shows
that such men often do explain their preference in terms of racial stereotypes,
attraction to racialized Asian phenotypes, or other purported racial or cultural
differences (e.g., better success with Asian women). Now, it is certainly true that
such men—who self-identify with their preference to the point of willingness to
be interviewed or to join online communities—might be extreme cases and hence
unrepresentative of other men with yellow fever of whom this is not true. But
in either case Asian/American women must always contend—at least initially and
often long after—with the possibility that attraction might be due to racial fetish
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and that racial fetish might be due to stereotyping. These suspicions may be difficult
or impossible to dispel. Chou (2012: 94) writes:
After giving lectures about the subject of Asian American sexual
politics, I have had women come up to me afterward sharing doubt
of whether they can ever have white male, and sometimes any non-
Asian, partners again. Once they have realized that they were fetishized
in the past, it has become almost impossible for them to be clear of any
doubt that his interest is free from racial stereotyping. As women of
color with increased racial consciousness, they can never be sure.
Suspicions occasioned by yellow fever are of a piece with more general racial
doubt, imposed by the way social reality is still ordered according to highly racial-
ized patterns of behavior and outcomes. Particular instances of these patterns may
be caused by bias, prejudice, or discrimination—individual or institutional, explicit
or implicit, intentional or unintentional—or theymay not be. But in all cases, within
such aworld, people of colormust expend valuable psychic and emotional resources
on negotiating the problem of constant doubt as they move through it. With every
instance of exclusionary behavior, racially inflected comment or joke, negative or
indeed positive professional evaluation, people of color must decide whether or
not to question it, ignore it, analyze it, challenge it, file a complaint, seek others’
opinion and validation, etc.—all of this takes energy and a toll in ways that White
people do not experience (at least not on account of their Whiteness). Negotiating
doubt can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies (e.g., Steele, Spencer, and Aronson 2002)
and to insecurity about one’s abilities, worth, and rationality (e.g., Gildersleeve,
Croom, and Vasquez 2011). Having to struggle to justify the rationality of one’s
own reactions, as I suggested earlier, is a form of hermeneutical injustice because
dominant color-blind ideologies suppress explanations based on race even while
people continue to experience racialized patterns of treatment. Conversely, even
those Asian/American women who ultimately resolve doubts about yellow fever
by being unbothered by it or by embracing it or by undergoing the relational
work required to establish definitively that their partners are not homogenizing
and otherizing them were still saddled, in the first place, with a problem that others
are not forced to deal with; very few Asian/American women, if any, can be wholly
oblivious to or untouched by it. And it is worth noting that women reporting more
positive experiences of yellow fever are often quickly disillusioned, conflicted, or
accept the stereotypes themselves (Chou 2012: 9, Chou, Lee, and Ho 2015: 30,
Parren˜as Shimizu 2007: 3, Prasso 2006: 140).
By contrast, blondes and brunettes as such have not suffered histories of
exploitation, colonization, slavery, persecution, and exclusion on the basis of
phenotype. Nor does hair or eye color track categorical differences across all
social, economic, and political dimensions of life, including opportunities for health,
education, jobs, relationships, legal protections, and more. But race does—in ways
that Asian/American women and other people of color experience on a daily basis.
Thus while some doubts about fungibility might be an inescapable part of all sexual
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and romantic relationships, whether grounded in physical appearance, personality,
or other bases of attraction, racial fetish raises additional and uniquely racialized
doubts that require emotionally taxing work to set to rest. The MPA thus fails
to recognize the historical and categorical nature of differential treatment based
on racialized phenotypes, in virtue of which racial fetishes form only one part
of a general pattern and due to which people of color continue to shoulder
disproportionate psychic burdens. More generally, advocates of a color-blind
ideology fail to understand the ways in which a historically and presently racially
ordered world—even if there remained only outwardly ‘nonracial’ processes—still
reproduces racial dynamics that affect people of color in negative ways and hence
serve to re-entrench legacies of racial oppression.
The specifically racialized discomfort experienced by individual targets also
provides a clue as to the role that yellow fever plays in a larger system of structural
racism, that is, in the wrongful representation of Asian women as a group.My point
here is this: whether or not some particular case of racial fetish is caused by an
individual’s harboring racial stereotypes at some level, it inevitably has the effect of
reinforcing racial stereotypes. Again, this is true whether or not, as a matter of fact,
racialized dating patterns are driven by racial fetishes in reality. Empirical evidence
drawn from real-world dating behavior is mixed; some researchers suggest that it is
actually Asian women’s preferences against Black and Hispanic men that explains
the frequency of White men and Asian women in relationships and that White men
do not show a preference for Asian women (e.g., Fisman et al. 2008).Others argue
that White sexual preferences, which are influenced by racialized and gendered
cultural stereotypes, play a larger role (e.g., Feliciano, Robnett, and Komaie 2009).
My concern is rather with the social or expressive meaning of yellow fever: with
what Laurie Shrage (1992: 44) in a paper on cross-racial prostitution describes as
the ‘culturally patterned principles of social hierarchy implicit in [men’s] selection of
prostitutes’. Consider the fact that, although White people are much more likely to
date within their race than outside it, there is no term for ‘white fever’ comparable to
‘yellow fever’, ‘jungle fever’, and so on. Choosing to date non-Whites—particularly
if you are White—is a deviation that demands explanation. This is why preferences
like yellow fever lend themselves so easily to being collectively understood as
fetishes. Racialized preferences for a specific out-group possess what Elizabeth
Anderson and Richard Pildes (2000) call ‘expressive meanings’:
Expressive meanings are socially constructed. These meanings are a
result of the ways in which actions fit with (or fail to fit with) other
meaningful norms and practices in the community.... The expressive
meaning of a norm does not inhere in that norm in isolation, but is
a product of interpreting the norm in the full context in which it is
adopted and implemented. (1525)
That is how fetish ‘fits’ into a White-dominated world and why, for example,
popular media always pick up the story and why yellow fever remains a perennial
object of public fascination. Defenders of yellow fever who appeal to the MPA try
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to rehabilitate themselves as nondeviant by portraying their preference as nothing
more than proper appreciation for Asian women’s beauty.
But in the context of a racially ordered world, this move fails. Minimal race is
something to be achieved, not assumed. As race does make a difference in every
other sphere of life, the expressive meaning of yellow fever is that there is something
different about Asian women, something that must be more than mere phenotype.
Just as the meanings of words are not wholly up to the individual, such that some
words take on an offensive public meaning even if the individual did not intend
to offend, so too do racial fetishes in a racially stratified society express racially
stereotypical social meanings even if not caused by them and even if individuals with
the preference do not endorse them. The more it is known or popularly believed
that (White) men have preferences for Asian women, the more difficult it will be
for Asian women to be viewed in terms other than as sexual objects. Olivia Espin’s
(1995: 234) study of immigrant women describes one case as follows: ‘Jazmin
is keenly aware of the racist stereotypes of Asian women as whores and worries
about how she is perceived by strangers when she is affectionate in public with her
Caucasian boyfriend. She knows that her race is part of her attractiveness for some
white men’. In another interview study by queer and ethnic studies scholar Jeeyeun
Lee (1996: 119), a lesbian woman declares: ‘I hate seeing Asian women with a
white man. I hate it, I just hate it.... I guess it feels especially weird, because every
time I see that, I know that’s what I’m looked at as [sic]. That’s how people see
me, as somebody who should be with a white man’. These are direct consequences
of yellow fever itself, regardless of its origins. In this way the deviance spreads
from the fetishist to its targets. Indeed, women of color more generally (the ‘hot
Latina’, the ‘Black ho’) are all hypersexualized in this way as possessing essentially
deviant sexual natures (Collins 2005; Guille´n 2015; Parren˜as Shimizu 2007). It is
this expressive social meaning of yellow fever that targets of yellow fever detect
and are discomforted by, however inarticulately.
This analysis of expressive meaning also helps explain one of the otherwise
puzzling features of yellow fever: if Asian women are so beautiful, why is there
such contempt for the men who prefer them? Prasso (2006), Kim (2011), and
Chou (2012) cite evidence that Asian women are perceived to be more accepting
of men who are older, unattractive, and socially inept; for example, many of the
user-submitted entries on ‘yellow fever’ featured on UrbanDictionary are openly
derisive in listing interests, e.g., anime and manga, associated with ‘nerds’ and
‘geeks’ or explicitly associating it with ‘male caucasians who haven’t yet been
laid or haven’t gotten up to any level sexually’. This is likely due to the global
economic conditions under which many Asian immigrant women of lower-class
backgrounds enter marriages with White men. But the result, which conforms to
an implicit logic of racial hierarchy, is that White men with yellow fever are often
viewed as men unable to date White women. They are, in other words, considered
to be ‘inferior goods’, acceptable to (inferior) Asian women (who may be motivated
only by material gain) and who are in this way disadvantageously contrasted with
White women despite the positive nature of the stereotype. Again, this is a matter
of social meaning and representation, of stigma spreading from fetish to target.
The supposed sexual superiority of Asian women ultimately renders them inferior
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as full human beings; they are more completely reduced to having value only as
sexual or domestic objects.
Note that particular racial fetishes based on contingent personal histories do
not avoid this problem. For it is still a fundamentally racial classification that is
doing the work here: why should a person’s racialized phenotypes, rather than
her personality, hobbies, or even other physical traits be seized upon as the basis
for future preferences? But as I have argued, differential treatment on the basis of
even minimal race carries with it unavoidably robust racial meanings so long as
racialized patterns and structures are in place. Even if racial fetishes do not originate
from stereotypes, they are still socially interpreted and made sense of in racially
stereotypical ways. Notably, Mills (1994: 149) reaches a similar conclusion about
Black men marrying White women: even if it were possible for such men to be free
of the suspicion that they are motivated by racial self-contempt, the meaning of
their actions would be, in his words, ‘sending a message to the world that... black
women just ain’t good enough’. Social psychologist Kay and colleagues (2013) have
also showed that exposure even to positive stereotypes makes people more likely
to adopt views of racialized groups as biologically and essentially distinct, and
makes them subsequently more likely to ascribe negative stereotypes to racialized
groups. Finally, another direct effect of yellow fever and other racial fetishes is that
they reinforce racialized social structures, such as online dating sites that allow
filtering by race, for example, or racial categories of pornography (for discussion,
see Robinson 2008). The role of racial fetishes in perpetuating material practices of
racial classification and reproducing racial meanings means that racial phenotypes
are not like others, and this ultimately renders the second premise of the Mere
Preferences Objection false. Yellow fever, by its very nature, is no mere preference.
5. Concluding Thoughts
I have argued against the claim that racial fetishes are no different from widely
accepted personal or aesthetic preferences for phenotypical traits, such as hair
and eye color, and provided empirical evidence to support the claim that they
are traceable to hypersexualized racial stereotypes. But I have also argued that
racial fetishes are problematic even if they are not caused by racial stereotypes
(however unlikely that may be), for at least two reasons. Even without stereotypical
content, racial fetishes depersonalize and otherize their targets, subjecting them
to disproportionate psychological burdens of doubt, suspicion, and insecurity on
account of their race. Moreover, regardless of origin, racial fetishes in a racially
stratified society are still interpreted and explained by—and hence express—
racially stereotypic social meanings. In this final section, I will consider some
objections.
First, one might object that my argument proves too much. What about, say,
gender and sexual orientation? Gender has also been the basis for historical and
categorical oppression, and sexual preferences based on specific gender certainly
contribute to the sexual objectification and other harms suffered by women and
LGBTQ individuals. Won’t these also count as morally problematic ‘fetishes’ and
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won’t this be a reductio ad absurdum? (This is the precisely the thrust behind several
of Halwani’s (forthcoming) arguments.) In reply, let me give both a radical and a
conservative response. The radical response would be to bite the bullet and concede
that sexual preferences based on gender and sexual orientation are indeed morally
problematic. But note that this is far from saying something absurd. Feminist
philosophers and activists have long seriously considered whether there are moral
obligations to be lesbian, bisexual, or pansexual (see, e.g., Trebilcot 2009). And
one person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens: legal scholars Ayres and
Brown (2011: 30–38) argue by analogy from the moral objectionableness of the
racial case to the case of sex and gender, concluding that it is morally better to
have sexual preferences that do not discriminate according to sex and gender. They
argue, like Thomas (1999), that insofar as sexually intimate relationships are more
important than the many other professional and public relationships for which
racial or sex discrimination is forbidden, there should be even stronger reason
against such discrimination in the intimate realm. Kate Bornstein (1994) has also
argued that gender identity should not determine sexual preferences and advocates
preferences based instead on preferred sexual activity, for example, top or bottom,
dominant or submissive, etc. I believe, moreover, that the enormous variation in
historical and cultural standards of sexual attractiveness suggests that humans are
capable of such radically widened standards.
My own inclination is to think that there is an important kernel of truth in
our resistance to thinking preferences based on gender and sexual orientation are
reprehensible: the kernel is that sexual preferences are not in and of themselves
morally problematic. In an ideal world, where norms of beauty and attractiveness
are such that any given individual stands a chance of being viewed as attractive,
or where those norms attach only to traits that could be voluntarily adopted
or modified, we might have very few grounds for criticizing sexual preferences.
But, I maintain, in an imperfect world that is highly racialized, gendered, and
heteronormative, sexual preferences are morally objectionable whenever they are
systematized so as to track and reproduce institutions of oppression, even if they
glorify rather than stigmatize.
A more conservative response might start from the observation that the targets
of preferences based on gender and sexual orientation do not appear to feel the
way that the targets of racial fetish do. Most people do not feel depersonalized
or otherized by the fact that their attractiveness to others may be contingent on
their gender. This indicates something important: the expressive meanings of such
preferences are not the same. Insofar as the ‘rules of the game’ are defined in terms
of gender and sexual orientation, distinguishing potential partners on the basis of
gender and sexual orientation does not mean that those others are submitted to
any differential treatment.2 What matters is being able to ‘play on equal terms’,
as it were. As soon as we consider cases where people are presumptively denied
such equal footing, the problem of fetish emerges again: preferences for transgender
people, people with disabilities, and fat people are similarly regarded by (some of)
2 I am grateful to Nils-Hennes Stear for discussion on this point.
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their targets as ‘fetishes’, and with just the same sort of discomfort (Emens 2009;
Saguy 2002; Solvang 2007; Tompkins 2014).
This brings me to another objection: what about ‘progressive’ fetishes that work
to counteract systems of oppression? Men who prefer Asian men, for instance, are
referred to (often derisively) as ‘rice queens’ in gay communities.3 There are similar
monikers for ‘tranny chasers’, ‘amputee devotees’, and ‘fat admirers’ (Caluya 2008;
Saguy 2002; Solvang 2007; Tompkins 2014). Ayres and Brown (2011: 34–37)
defend an ‘antisubordination norm’ according to which preferences based on
race and gender should be morally evaluated according to whether or not they
advance the liberation of historically subordinated groups. Does my account, then,
encourage racial fetishes that are antisubordinating?
Not necessarily. To be sure, transgender, disability, and fat activists and scholars
have argued for destigmatizing those who find such people attractive because of
the implicit assumption that attraction to them must somehow be deviant and
abnormal; many self-identified disability and fat fetishists appeal to the MPA in
exactly the same fashion as race fetishists (Saguy 2002; Solvang 2007). And in
accordance with the vision I outlined above, I fully endorse the widening of beauty
norms. However, I think problems of depersonalization and otherizing will be there
just the same; as noted, they are already expressed by some transgender, disabled,
and fat targets. For individuals who have otherwise been so completely excluded
from the game, this may be a price worth paying for the chance to play, and they
may embrace fetishization. But I suspect that the appeal of such a trade-off, and
hence the acceptability of the fetish, diminishes in proportion to greater progress.
(Legal scholar Elizabeth Emens [2009: 1343, fn. 153] observes that the National
Association for Fat Advancement previously posted, but has since removed, an
official policy in support of ‘fat admirers’.) Cross-racial attraction, while perhaps
once stigmatized as strongly as transgender, disability, and fat attraction, is so much
more accepted and normalized now that the problem of fetish looms far larger than
the problem of exclusion from play. My sense, thus, is that such fetishes, even if
encountered on the road to progress, are still morally unfortunate.
Finally, one might object on the basis of ‘ought implies can’: if a sexual
preference (for race, gender, etc.) isn’t under a person’s control, how can it be
morally objectionable? Won’t we all be forced to deny ourselves love and sex?
First, let me be clear that I have not advocated any particular course of action;
interracial relationships, like all relationships, must be navigated on a case-by-case
basis according to the priorities, values, and trade-offs of the particular individuals
involved. Moreover, contra the MPA, racial fetish and its attendant harms are the
result of systems of racial meaning and structures of racial disadvantage, not just of
flawed individuals. We would thus do better to direct our attention to eliminating
the collective existence of racialized sexual stereotypes as expressed through social
practice, rather than fixating on the fraught question of whether or not they are
‘really’ behind some particular individual’s preference. (In other words, we can
simply set aside the question of whether people’s racial fetishes render them racist,
3Though, as I am grateful to Shen-yi Liao for pointing out, such preferences are hardly progressive insofar
as Asian men are desired and stereotypically feminized only as ‘bottoms’.
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or ethically defective, since, as I have shown, we can object to these preferences
on other grounds.) This is something all of us are implicated in, whether we have
fetishes or not. Morality can thus require of all of us, though more urgently in the
case of those with racial fetish, that we critically scrutinize our own preferences
as well as work toward modifying racially unjust social patterns and structures.
Emens (2009: 1366), for instance, recommends a dual-level approach to what she
calls ‘intimate discrimination’.
First, on an individual level, people can engage in ‘structured self-inquiry’ as
an ‘ethical endeavor’: they can ask themselves, first, what is actually required for
the ‘essential functions’ of being a dating, sexual, romantic, or marriage partner
and, second, whether some ‘accommodation’ could be made such that a social
identity, such as race or disability, would no longer preclude a potential partner
from performing that function. This kind of critical reflection—undertaken not
primarily to assess whether one secretly or implicitly holds stereotypes, but in
order to guide future action and growth in response to an unjustified (and, as
I have argued, harmful) preference—can set in motion actual behaviors that are
not only nonfetishizing but that also have the potential to widen and reshape
preferences, for example, expanding and diversifying one’s dating pool, social
venues, or media consumption. Second, Emens (2009: 1367) also stresses the
importance of working for solutions at the structural level. For instance, high levels
of residential segregation by race decreases the chances of cross-racial interaction
and hence opportunities to form intimate relationships, and the local availability of
disability accommodations or of the rights attached to the legal status of marriage
alters the difficulties of relationships involving members of certain social groups.
By working collectively to bring about better social policy, individuals work to
alter the structural conditions that serve to support or undermine their sexual
preferences; this structural approach addresses the role that yellow fever and other
racial fetishes play in a racially stratified social world.
All of this means, I think, that we can and should push back against the standard
view that we are not responsible for our sexual preferences because we cannot
voluntarily choose or control them by fiat. Instead, we should recognize that we
can control whether we choose to take responsibility for our sexual preferences
and desires. Feminist, gay, and lesbian philosophers have long argued for the ways
in which sexual preferences and identities are not just ‘given’, fixed, and handed
to us on silver platters, but are interpreted, endorsed, or transformed through our
capacities for agency and rationality. For instance, William Wilkerson (2009: 100)
argues that ‘adopting a sexual identity involves a process of acting on a persistent
desire, but knowing one’s persistent desire involves an act of interpretation that
partially constitutes that desire’, concluding that sexual identity is partly constituted
by choice. Joyce Trebilcot (2009: 341) has also argued for the view that ‘one
might discover/create one’s own sexuality on the basis of one’s feelings and one’s
politics, on the basis of reasons, on the rational-emotional weighing of all one
deems relevant’; taking responsibility for heterosexuality, for instance, consists in
‘acknowledging the experiences and feelings she has that are parts of her hetero-
sexuality, and also making the decision to participate or not in the institution of
heterosexuality [which] consists not just of sexual activity, but of a myriad of values
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and practices’. My hope is that this paper has contributed to the task of developing
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